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Introduction
The model
Solution
Qualitative properties
Context of the paper
Groundwater extraction: marginal cost depends on the
level of the aquifer
In general, resources with accessibility problems: cost
depends on scarcity
The main ingredient: make the cost depend on the
projected evolution of the resource: before or after the
extraction or rainfall
The goal: deduce its economical and environmental
consequences
The method: revisit the discrete time, innite horizon
dynamic game model of Provencher and Burt (JEEM
1993).
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Contributions
We analyze a variant of Provencher and Burt's model, in the
linear-quadratic case.
We characterize the existence of Nash equilibria in ane
feedback
We prove qualitative properties of equilibria as a function
of the discount factor.
We discuss the particular cases: myopic (zero discount
factor) and golden rule (discount factor tending to one).
We focus on the case of scarse resources and nd that
taking harvesting and rainfall into account in the cost is
better than the standard situation.
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Criteria of evaluation
Criteria for dening the better situation
individual welfare of players
state of the resource
I asymptotic (steady state)
I transient (not in this study)
social welfare (not in this study)
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The model of Provencher and Burt
We consider the extraction of groundwater by two players.
The dynamic of groundwater:
Gt+1 = Gt + R   u
1
t   u
2
t ; G0; given:
We suppose R is a constant.
The instantaneous prot:
i = Fi(u
i
t)  Ci(Gt)  u
i
t :
The marginal extraction cost (Ci(:)) depends on the current
level of the groundwater.
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The extended model
Introduce the more general instantaneous prot function:
i(u
i
t) = Fi(u
i
t)  Ci(Gt +mR   n(u
1
t + u
2
t )) u
i
t
where n;m 2 [0; 1].
The extreme cases:
n = 0;m = 0 (the standard case): cost based on current
resource
n = 1;m = 1: cost based on the state of the resource in
the following period.
When n 6= 0 the prot function of player i depends on the
action of the other player: strategic interaction not just
through the dynamics.
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The dynamic game setting
We formulate a discrete time, innite-horizon, discounted
dynamic game: for player i 2 f1; 2g,
max
fuitg
t
1X
0
t [Fi(u
i
t)  Ci(Gt +mR   n(u
1
t + u
2
t )) u
i
t ];
such that
Gt+1 = Gt + R   u
1
t   u
2
t ; G0; given:
The Bellman equation associated with a Nash Feedback
equilibrium is:
V i(G0) = max
uit

Fi(u
i)  Ci(G +mR   n(u
1
t + u
2
t ))u
i
+ V i(Gt + R   (u
1
t + u
2
t ))

:
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Analysis of the model
solution in the linear-quadratic case
exercise in sensitivity analysis
still work in progress!
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General linear-quadratic solution
The symmetric case
Solution in the Linear-Quadratic case
Assume:
Fi(u) = u  
bi
2
u2; Ci(x) = zi   cix > 0:
We propose as solution of the Bellman equation:
a value function for Player i 2 f1; 2g of the form
V i(G ) =
Ai
2
G 2 + BiG + Ci ;
a feedback law of the form
ui = iG + i :
The unknown Ai , Bi , Ci , i , i , i = 1; 2, are found identifying
the coecients of the quadratic function in the Bellman
equation after optimization
the optimal strategy for j and the one conjectured by i . 9 / 29
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General linear-quadratic solution
The symmetric case
Solution in the Linear-Quadratic case (ctd)
More precisely, a solution by stages:
system of 3rd degree polynomial equations for f1; 2g
A1 and A2 as simple functions of f1; 2g
Ai =
ci(1  jn)  i(b + 2cin)
(1  1   2)
linear system for fB1;B2; 1; 2g
simple formulas for fC1;C2g.
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General linear-quadratic solution
The symmetric case
Interior solutions
The existence of a useful solution is not granted because:
the LQ problem is not concave
i(u) = u(1  zi  
bi
2
u) + ciuG
there are physical constraints:
positive harvesting (!)
uit  0; 8t
positive and bounded stock
G  Gt  0; 8t:
=) we nd only interior solutions.
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General linear-quadratic solution
The symmetric case
Equilibrium trajectories
When ane feedback controls ui = iG + i are implemented,
the dymamics becomes:
Gt = (1  1   2)Gt 1 + R   1   2
with solution:
Gt = (1  1   2)
tG0 +
R   1   2
1 + 2
(1  (1  1   2)
t):
Necessary conditions for the trajectory to be valid are:
0  1 + 2 < 2
1 + 2  R .
Otherwise, an interior solution of our problem does not exit.
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The symmetric case
The symmetric linear quadratic case
Symmetric case: look for symmetric equilibria: 1 = 2 = .
With the procedure described above we nd that  solves:
p(Z ) := 

2(b + 2cn)Z 3   (3b + 8cn)Z 2 + 2cZ
	
+(1  ) f (b + 3cn)Z + cg = 0:
Existence and uniqueness of solution
There is one unique root of p(Z ) in (0; 1) if
c <
b
1+ 
:
If c < b=2, this root actually satises:
0   
c
b + 3cn
<
1
2
:
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The symmetric case
Solution (end)
Once  is determined, we can compute
A =
c    (b + 3cn)
(1  2)
 =

c

1  z +mcR  
R[c   (b + 3cn)]
(1  2)(1   + )

B = : : :
C = : : :
Observations:
 and A do not depend on z , R or m
 and B depend linearly on m and R
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Variation with respect to the discount factor
Comparison of cost situations
The myopic case
The dynamic case
Qualitative analysis
We investigate the variation of the equilibrium (feedback
parameters, value)
when the discount factor  varies
when the cost adjustment parameters n (harvest) and m
(rainfall) vary.
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Variation with respect to the discount factor
Comparison of cost situations
The myopic case
The dynamic case
Variation with respect to 
When agents are more shortsighted, they react more
agressively and the environment suers, whatever the cost
structure.
Monotony in 
Under the assumption c < b=2, the function:
 7! () is decreasing on [0; 1]
 7! () is decreasing on [0; 1] when it is positive
 7! G1() is increasing when  is positive.
We conjecture that () is actually always decreasing.
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The green golden rule,  = 1
Note that the limit when  goes to 1 can allow to select a
solution for the static green golden rule
max
ui
Fi(u
i)  Ci(:)u
i ; such that u1 + u2 = R :
As it is well know, this is a game with coupled constraints and
there exists an innite number of solutions.
In the symmetric case, limt!1 u
i
t = R=2 for i = 1; 2 and all .
But in the asymmetric case this limit can allow to select one
equilibrium.
Observe that lim"1 (1) 6= 0.
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Comparing the cost situations
Lexicon for the cost mechanism:
tag n m
00 0 0 before rainfall and harvest
H0 1 0 after harvest but before rainfall
0R 0 1 before harvest but after rainfall
HR 1 1 after harvest and rainfall
Since the equilibrium reaction rate  and the leading
coecient A do not depend on R , nor on m:
0R = 00 H0 = HR
A0R = A00 AH0 = AHR :
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Benchmark situation: the myopic case  = 0
When  = 0, we nd:
u(G ) =
c
b + 3cn| {z }
(0)
G +
1  z + cmR
b + 3cn| {z }
(0)
:
The value function of both players is:
(G0) =
(cG0 + 1  z + cmR)
2
(b + 3cn)2
b + 2cn
2
:
And the asymptotic stock is:
G1 =
R   2(0)
2(0)
=
R(b + 3cm   2cn)  2(1  z)
2c
:
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The myopic case
The dynamic case
Clearly:
@(0)
@n
< 0;
@(G0)
@n
< 0;
@(0)
@m
> 0;
@(G0)
@m
> 0:
Accordingly:
Ranking of controls, gains and steady states
Controls are ordered as: uH0(G ) < u00(G ) and
uH0(G ) < uHR(G ); u00(G ) < u0R(G )
Value functions are ordered as: H0(G ) < 00(G ) and
H0(G ) < HR(G ); 00(G ) < 0R(G )
Steady-state stocks are ordered as:
G1H0 > G
1
HR > G
1
00
> G1
0R : 20 / 29
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Rankings (ctd)
Under additional conditions: if R small enough (scarse
resource), controls and values can be totally ordered.
uH0(G ) < uHR(G ) < u00(G ) < u0R(G )
H0(G ) < HR(G ) < 00(G ) < 0R(G )
G1H0 > G
1
HR > G
1
00
> G1
0R :
However, in order to have positive harvesting policy for all G
and a positive steady state, we must impose
R >
2(1  z)
b   2c
that is, R not too small.
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The dynamic case
Numerical illustration
Case of interior feedback but dierent rankings for controls
R small R large
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Variation of  and 
Towards a generalization of these ndings to general  2 [0; 1].
Variations of  and 
The function n 7! (n) is decreasing, so that,
0R = 00 > H0 = HR :
The function m 7! (m) is increasing, so that:
H0 < HR ; 00 < 0R
and consequently:
uH0(G ) < uHR(G ); u00(G ) < u0R(G ):
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Constraints on the rainfall level R
According to the formula for :
 =

c

1  z +mcR  
R[c   (b + 3cn)]
(1  2)(1   + )

the constraints
0   
R
2
imply that R should be not too small and not too large...
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Other properties
...
We have:
when  > 0, and R small enough, the total ranking of
controls hold:
uH0(G ) < uHR(G ) < u00(G ) < u0R(G ):
when   0 and z < 1, then  > 0: the equilibrium
control u(G ) is valid for all G
when   1,  < 0.
More analysis is needed for  large and R small.
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When determining cost after harvesting and rainfall
is a good economic and environmental option
Assume:  = 0:3; b = 1; c = 0:04; z = 0:9;R = 1:
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Scarce resources, ctd
We have:
G1
00
< G1HR , as always;
u00(G ) > uHR(G );V00(G ) > VHR(G ); when G big,
same ranking as in the myopic case: conict;
u00(G ) < uHR(G );V00(G ) < VHR(G ); when G small,
reversed ranking: win-win.
When the level of the groundwater is small, setting costs after
harvesting and rainfall is better from the economic and
environmental point of view than the standard literature case
where the cost is announced before rain and harvesting, even
for quite myopic agents.
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Conclusions and extensions
Conclusions:
We illustrate the interest to charge users in function of
their behavior, not just in function of the level of resource
Possibility of win-win situations
More analysis to better explain the phenomenon
Extensions:
Stochastic case
Stackelberg game with the regulator announcing the cost
...
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Stochastic extension
Assume the recharge is a i.i.d. sequence fRt ; t = 0; 1; : : :g.
In the LQ case, the Bellman equation becomes:
V i(G0) = max
uit

Fi(u
i)  Ci(G +mER   n(u
1
t + u
2
t ))u
i
+ EV i(Gt + R   (u
1
t + u
2
t ))

= max
uit

Fi(u
i)  Ci(G +mER   n(u
1
t + u
2
t ))u
i
+ V i(Gt + ER   (u
1
t + u
2
t )) +
1
2
2R(V
i)00

and has the same controls as solution.
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